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The importance of liberal values within policing: police and crime 
commissioners, police independence and the spectre of illiberal 
democracy 
Abstract 
The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) in England and 
Wales has reignited discussions about police governance. This paper contributes 
to these debates by focusing on the role liberal values play within liberal 
democratic ideals of policing. It suggests, policing principles historically have 
been informed primarily by liberal goals; that is to say these principles are liberal 
before they are democratic. Policing in England and Wales today, however, is 
increasingly informed by democratic values at the expense of liberal principles. 
The spectre of illiberal democracy is considered here as a warning in light of this 
development. The paper argues that there is a growing disparity between the 
rhetoric of liberal policing principles, historically rooted in pre-democratic times, 
and the reality of contemporary policing in societies that are increasingly 
sensitive to democratic expectations. Police independence is used to illustrate this 
argument. Police independence is still revered in rhetoric today, but the liberal 
origin of this concept is not recognised. But the idea that the police should retain 
a degree of freedom from political interference makes sense from a liberal 
perspective, one that is increasingly difficult to defend as liberal values decline in 
importance, and democratic aspirations come to the fore. The paper concludes by 
suggesting that liberal values are, on the one hand, increasingly difficult to 
accommodate within contemporary ideas of policing, but are at the same time 
becoming more necessary, especially following the introduction of PCCs. 
Key words: liberal democratic policing; police independence; police and crime commissioners; 
illiberal democracy 
Introduction 
The election of the first Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) in England and Wales 
in November 2012 marked a significant departure from the tripartite arrangements for 
police accountability that had been in existence since the Police Act 1964 (Gilmore 
2012a; Newburn 2012; Sampson 2012; Lister 2013; Millie and Bullock 2013; Rogers 
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2013). This development has been presented as the most momentous change in British 
policing since 1829 by supporters and critics alike (May 2012; Orde 2012). It is part of 
a number of radical policing reforms that have reignited an already growing political 
interest in police accountability (McLaughlin 2005; Jones 2008; Gilling 2013; Reiner 
2013; Rogers 2013; Lister and Rowe 2014; Turner 2014).  
The most contentious aspect of the introduction of PCCs from the perspective of 
this paper is the fact that candidates are directly elected into post (see Jethwa’s 2012 
collection). There is a fear that this endangers the long-standing assumption that the 
work of the police should not be controlled by persons/bodies with a partisan political 
agenda (Chakrabarti 2012; Joyce 2011; APA 2010; Lister and Rowe 2014). At the very 
least, as Lister (2013, p.240) suggests, electoral pressures on PCCs increases the 
likelihood of them seeking ‘to interfere in what Chief Constables do’. This concern is 
heightened by what Loader (2014, p.44) sees as an ‘impoverished’ understanding of 
police work narrowly conceived exclusively in crime fighting terms. This fosters, he 
continues, a greater likelihood of external pressures on police to act in ways that pay 
little concern for ‘unpopular minorities . . . civil liberties and the rule of law’ (Loader 
2014, p.48).    
A concern in this paper is the extent to which liberal values are being forsaken in 
police practice and policy. There is, I suggest, a growing gap between the rhetoric of 
policing ideals, which are rooted in nineteenth century liberal values, and the 
increasingly democratic sensibilities of the twenty-first century that reject liberal ideals 
as elitist. Sklansky (2008) charts a transition in democratic ideas in America over the 
past sixty years that has seen a decline in the fortunes of a liberally informed pluralist 
perspective that places faith not in the masses but rather in elites and responsible 
leaders. In its place, participatory and deliberative forms of democracy that champion 
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public engagement and involvement as goods in and of themselves are come 
increasingly to the fore. He argues that this shift in democratic thinking has coincided 
with a complementary shift in ideas about policing from a liberally framed professional 
model, intended to ensure ‘insulation from partisan politics’ (Sklansky 2008, p.37), 
towards a community model that seeks to dissolve any such insulation to maximise the 
democratic influence communities can have on policing matters. 
The democratic idea that policing should be influenced by the will of the people 
is not new (Scarman 1981; Waddington 1999; Home Office 2004). Indeed, as indicated 
above, such a view has become increasingly dominant within notions of democratic 
policing (Sklansky 2008), despite resistance from chief police officers under the banner 
of police independence (Gilling 2013). PCCs, if nothing else, clearly have the potential 
to undermine the police independence defence in practice (Newburn 2012; Orde 2012), 
irrespective of commitments to it rhetorically (see especially point 30 of the Policing 
Protocol Order 2011). This has raised concerns within policing bodies, summed up by 
Sir Hugh Orde, President of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), in an 
early response to the idea of a directly elected official being given the responsibility of 
holding the police to account: 
Even the perception that the police service of this country… is under any political 
influence, I think that suggests you cannot argue that you are a proper democratic 
society. It's as simple and as stark as that.  (Sir Hugh Orde, cited in BBC 2009). 
It is difficult to see how this idea of police independence, underpinned as it is by liberal 
considerations, can survive in practice. The shift in democratic norms referred to by 
Sklansky (2008) have resulted in liberal democracies becoming more democratic but 
less liberal (Zakaria 2004) and the concept of police independence is consequently 
vulnerable. But whilst police independence is perceived by some to have been abused 
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far too frequently, it has also provided an important constitutional conceptual bulwark 
against the idea of a police state or anything that comes close to resembling such a thing 
(Sklansky 2008). The spectre of what Zakaria (2004) has identified as illiberal 
democratic tendencies creeping into police practices in England and Wales becomes a 
concern in this regard. 
Zakaria’s (2004) use of the term illiberal democracy is premised upon an 
understanding of liberal democracy that stresses a tension between liberal and 
democratic values. This tension is considered in more detail later in the article but for 
the moment it is important to note that if the liberal component is removed from the 
equation, then democracy per se will not necessarily address concerns beyond the 
interests of the majority. Liberal and democratic sensibilities are thus seen as 
contradictory components within a harmonious whole in which they interact in a 
complementary fashion. Liberal values restrain democratic impulses to give more voice 
to the majority by emphasising the importance of individuals, especially non-
conformists (Mill 1849). Democratic values restrain the liberal inclination towards 
elitism by insisting on giving more people in society a say on public matters.  
The idea of illiberal democracy is used to characterise a society in which people 
are given a say on public matters, but without safeguarding the rights of minorities. 
Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009, p.25) refer to this as ‘competitive authoritarianism’, in that 
there is a democratic electoral process between participants that are in substantive terms 
equally authoritarian.  
Policing was liberal before it was democratic 
Police independence is illustrative of the liberal underpinnings of the police ideals 
established in 1829. It is part of a long standing set of policing principles that have 
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endured for almost two hundred years (Rogers 2013). They are increasingly articulated 
today in democratic terms (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013; Reiner 2013) but it is 
important to note that they originate and make more sense from a liberal perspective.  
Resisting political influence over policing makes sense from a liberal 
perspective, one that favours strong independent and autonomous areas of social life 
beyond the direct control of government (Gray 1995; Zakaria 2004). It requires what Sir 
Paul Stephenson, former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, refers to as 
an ‘appropriate space between policing and politics’ (cited in Caless and Tong 2013, 
p.4). Appropriate space expresses the need to insulate policing, at least partially, from 
democratic forces. This accords with a liberal standpoint but it is difficult to sustain 
within the democratic expectations and sensibilities of contemporary society (Fukuyama 
2011). Democracy does not require such space and this is becoming increasingly 
evident within policing contexts. As Baldi and LaFrance (2012, p.149) note, the 
introduction of PCCs shifts the focus of police accountability towards ‘responsiveness 
to citizens and elected officials’ as opposed to ‘deference to and the maintenance of an 
image of professionalism’. This represents, they suggest, a shift towards a political form 
of accountability, informed by democratic values, as opposed to a professional form of 
accountability, influenced by liberal values.  
The emergence of modern police in pre-democratic Britain 
A key argument in this paper is that liberal values have had a distinct influence upon 
police governance especially within England and Wales (Lustgarten 1986; Uglow 1988; 
Stenning 2011). Modern policing emerged in England and Wales at a time when Britain 
lacked the credentials to be considered a democracy by today’s standards and 
expectations. In particular, the lack of popular participation is highly problematic from 
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today’s ideas of what constitutes a proper democracy (Lister and Rowe 2014). In 1829, 
less than 3% of the male population in Britain were entitled to vote (Zakaria 2004), and 
in the five general elections between 1812 and 1830 three quarters of Parliamentary 
seats were returned uncontested, thereby denying the overwhelming majority of the tiny 
democratic franchise the opportunity to vote during this period (Cox & Ingram III, 
1992). Britain at this time is described by Acemoglu & Robinson (2000, p.1167) as ‘an 
“oligarchy” run by an elite’. Britain only gradually became a substantive democracy 
over time following the franchise extensions in the 1832, 1867 and 1884 Electoral 
Reform Acts, and the extension of the vote to women in the Representation of the 
People Acts in 1918 and 1928.  
The 1832 Reform Act made little substantial change at the time to Britain’s 
democratic credentials (Phillips and Wetherell 1995); nor was it brought about because 
of significant popular pressure (Lizzeri and Persico 2004). Notwithstanding the growing 
influence of Chartism in Britain, the involvement of the masses at this time is felt much 
more through non-democratic expressions of violence of the kind cited by Emsley 
(2009), e.g. the Gordon Riots in 1780 and the revolutionary turmoil in France a decade 
later.   
However, the fact that Britain was not a democracy in 1829 is often ignored 
when references are made to Peel. There is a danger of an ahistorical analysis of Peel’s 
police and this is nowhere more evident than in a speech delivered by Damian Green, 
the Minister of State for Police and Criminal Justice, at the Policy Exchange in October 
2012. He cites the oft quoted Peelian notion that the police are the public and the public 
are the police and from this normative statement he goes on to make the rather dubious 
empirical claim that modern policing ‘was created by public minded citizens forming 
themselves into groups to protect society’ (Green 2012).  
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The Minister is ignoring the considerable opposition to the introduction of the 
police in 1829 and the ensuing disorder and anti-police riots in the 1830s and 1840s 
(Uglow 1988). More importantly, he is failing to recognise the considerable effort that 
was required in order to establish and maintain the somewhat ‘mythical’ doctrine 
(Brogden and Ellison, 2013, p.91) of policing by consent (Reiner 2010, Uglow 1988, 
Waddington 1999).  
None of this is to say that the introduction of police in Britain did not follow 
democratic processes, but rather that the society at large at that time was not 
democratic. Importantly though, Britain was a liberal society with a developed civil 
society (Zakaria 2004), and it was perceived as such, as ‘a land of liberty’ (Emsley 
2009, p.13). The introduction and development of police in England and Wales was 
informed and shaped by these prevailing liberal values, which are characterised by a 
cautious distrust in the state and a reluctance to give too much power to public 
authorities. The liberal ideal of police is captured well by Uglow (1988) when he 
questions the legitimacy, from a liberal perspective, of proactive policing on the 
grounds that it is unnecessarily intrusive. Consequently the principles of policing that 
emerged from the discussions and struggles in the early part of the nineteenth century in 
Britain gave shape to an idea of police that is both empowered (as experts insulated 
from overbearing government control) and constrained (through limited powers and 
restricted interventions into the lives of free born individuals) by liberal, not democratic, 
values.  
The healthy tension within liberal democracies 
It is important here to emphasise that liberal democracy comprises both a liberal and a 
democratic component. The relationship between these two components has been 
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historically problematic (Held 2006) and there is a fundamental contradiction between 
liberal and democratic sensibilities, albeit one that can produce a healthy liberal 
democratic sum that is greater than its liberal and democratic parts (Dryzek and 
Dunleavy 2009).  
The two components counterbalance one another. The liberal component limits 
the extent to which democracy influences all aspects of social life, and the democratic 
component challenges the authority that elite groups have over the majority. The liberal 
component is derived from principles that support a strong civil society (Boyd 2004) 
and champion the individual (Gray 1995). Democratic ideals on the other hand capture 
the popular will of the people and are thereby rooted in majority views (Hobsbawm 
2007) that demand a more involved form of governance (Bellamy 2000). The logic of 
liberalism is to preserve space beyond the reach of publically elected officials; the logic 
of democracy on the other hand is to bring more aspects of social life into the public 
realm.  
This liberal democratic tension can be seen within policing, to the extent that the 
idea of constabulary independence, which seeks to insulate operational policing from 
public scrutiny, sits ‘uneasily alongside the potentially more democratic idea of policing 
by consent’ (Loader 1996, fn.3, p.177). Sklansky (2014, p.344) presents this tension in 
terms of the contrast between a professional view of the police and the ‘citizens in 
uniform’ concept. Similarly, Stenson and Silverstone (2014, p.430) note a tension 
within police accountability mechanisms between the democratic inclination towards 
giving ‘citizens what they want’, and the provision of a liberally informed framework of 
‘values and practices that prioritise the worth of the individual, recognise minority 
rights, require checks and balances on the exercise of executive political power, and 
contain the use of force’.  
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Liberalism, as Gray (2000) argues, has different traditions that give rise to 
variations in liberal thinking. These range from a focus on liberty that primarily favours 
limited government, to ideas that are much more morally informed.  Stenson (1991, 
pp.8-9), for example, defines liberalism as ‘progressive approaches to social and 
economic policies’ that involve governments taking responsibility towards improving 
the lives of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable. However, within criminological 
discourse liberal values have come to be associated increasingly with the rise of neo-
liberalism (Reiner 2013; Turner 2014).  Neo-liberalism adopts a largely amoral stance 
on matters of social justice (Garland 2001), suggesting that the promotion of market 
principles are the only normative commitment required of government (Diamond 1997).  
The lack of any moral substance to neo-liberalism on matters of social justice 
means that it is incapable of providing the kind of liberal balance to democratic 
authority outlined above. The liberal component of a liberal democracy needs to be 
rooted in something more morally substantial than what is offered from a neo-liberal 
perspective in order for the liberal democratic tension to be meaningful. The liberal 
component needs to provide values that limit the extent to which public life can be 
determined by popular choices. Neo-liberalism lacks such moral conviction beyond 
supporting the market, which is itself an economic mechanism for maximising a 
particular kind of popular choice.  
However, the liberal democratic tension can be lost also if the morality provided 
by the liberal component becomes overbearing. Gray’s (2000) identification of two 
faces of liberalism is instructive here. In particular the tradition he identifies as a 
consensus seeking approach to liberal thinking is informed by a positive expression of 
freedom (see Berlin 1958) that establishes what it means to be human in ways that can 
be universalised. This tradition informs the elevation of human rights within liberal 
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democracies and has become increasingly influential within democratic contexts and 
conceptions of democratic policing (Manning 2010; Reiner 2013).  
However, there is a danger that establishing a moral consensus diminishes the 
tension between the liberal and democratic components of a liberal democracy. A moral 
consensus is, after all, yet another form of democratic expression, in which moral and 
consensual legitimacy become one and the same thing1.  
The liberal concept of toleration is relevant here. Sabl (2009) argues that liberal 
toleration addresses social problems in ways that contemporary forms of moral 
consensus such as dignity, respect and rights cannot. This is because these consensual 
moral concepts ‘yield uniform conclusions . . . that fail to address complications of 
circumstances’ (Sabl 2009, p.527). Liberal toleration, on the other hand, focuses on the 
individual circumstances that express differences and deviations from the norm. 
This is supported by Paetzold’s (2008) reference to Michael Walzer’s 
‘normative maxim’ on toleration: ‘Toleration makes difference possible; difference 
makes toleration necessary’ (cited in Paetzold 2008, p.942). But as Dworkin (2000) 
argues, democratic arguments challenge liberal toleration for failing to take heed of a 
community’s ethical stance on important social values. Democracy, in this respect, 
pushes us towards ‘majority rather than minority’ preferences (Dworkin 2000, p.213) 
and thereby pays less attention to preserving and tolerating minority values. 
This brings us back to a concern that democracy cannot guarantee liberal values. 
As Innes (1999) notes, authoritarian policing measures, such as zero tolerance policing, 
tend to attract popular support. Hobsbawm (2007) is more forceful. He says, ‘the case 
for liberal democracy rests on its constitutional liberal component rather than its 
                                                 
1  See Rescher (1993) for a critique of consensus and Simmons (2001) on the difference 
between consensual and moral legitimacy.  
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democratic, or more precisely electoral, component’, and furthermore, that ‘freedom 
and toleration for minorities are often more threatened than protected by democracy’ 
(Hobsbawm 2007, p.97).  
The irresistible rise of democratic sensibilities 
The degree to which democracy has become so widely acknowledged as the most 
legitimate form of governance in a relatively short space of time is astounding. As 
Fukuyama (2011, p.10) argues, democracy is the only form of ‘just governance’ 
endorsed by ‘important international institutions’ to the extent that authoritarian regimes 
feel obliged to stage elections to appear legitimate. However, it is not until the 
nineteenth century that democracy ceased to be viewed in negative terms, ‘as the enemy 
of liberalism’ (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009, p.18). Hobson (2008) argues it is only 
through the coupling of democracy with representation through the ideas of Thomas 
Paine and Maximilien Robespierre within the American and French Revolutions 
respectively that it came to be seen as a viable option in modern times. It is not until 
‘well into the twentieth century’ (Fukuyama 2011, p.322) or indeed the ‘late twentieth-
century’ (Held 2006, p.95) that democracy is established fully in North America and 
Western Europe.  
Democracy versus electoralism 
Democratic theory developed over the 19th and 20th Centuries and, in particular, beyond 
the seminal liberal democratic definition provided by Schumpeter (1942). Diamond 
(1997)  notes the increasingly complex manner in which democracy is discussed today 
citing a review of 150 studies conducted by Collier and Levitsky (1996) that noted 550 
‘subtypes’ of democracy.  
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Importantly though, within these subtypes there is a growing concern that 
democracy should be about more than elections. Consequently, ‘representative 
democracy’ is increasingly ‘viewed as insufficient’ (Newman et al 2004, p.204). 
Diamond (1997) cites the work of Dahl (1971) as an early proponent of democratic 
involvement outside of, and supplementary to, electoral processes2. The ‘fallacy of 
electoralism’ was coined by Karl (1986) and has been influential in fostering more 
complex and substantive variants of democracy (Diamond 1997). Sampson (2012) has 
also used the term electoralism to emphasise the rather narrow democratic credentials of 
the PCC centred police accountability mechanisms.  
Importantly though, the success of democracy, and its theoretical development, 
has been at the expense of liberalism. This shift from liberal to democratic values, 
particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, is captured by Arblaster’s (2002, 
p.107) positive reference to E.H.Carr’s call for ‘mass democracy’ to replace ‘the old 
liberal democracy of the nineteenth century’. It is also expressed negatively within 
Oakeshott’s (1991, p.386) observation, first made in 1949 that, ‘Liberty has become the 
emblem of frivolous or of disingenuous politics’. Liberal ideas have not disappeared 
completely but within liberal democratic debates they are increasingly subsumed within 
democratic considerations. This is evident within discussions about democratic policing. 
Democratic Policing 
The democratic credentials of policing as presented by Manning (2010) and Reiner 
(2013) emphasise the need to go beyond merely seeing democracy in electoral terms. 
They both stress democratic characteristics that are derived from concerns with human 
rights and issues of equality and justice. Manning (2010, p.viii) in particular focuses his 
                                                 
2
 see also Reiner’s  (2013) reference to Tawney (1964) 
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discussions on the political philosophy of Rawls (1971; 1993)3 by asking: ‘If a 
democracy rests on equality, justice, and basic rights and responsibilities, what role do 
the police play in shaping them?’ Manning (2010) argues that these underlying, 
fundamental virtues by which we judge democratic societies should be the qualities by 
which we measure the performance of the police. 
Reiner (2013) likewise is concerned with ensuring that policing is underpinned 
by the kind of democratic characteristics outlined by Manning (2010). He is particularly 
concerned with challenging ‘the last three decades of neo-liberal hegemony’ that have 
undermined the achievement of a more equitable society (Reiner 2013, p.161). 
As Turner (2014) notes, Manning (2010) and Reiner (2013) both emphasise the 
achievements of  policing in making society more democratic as opposed to focusing on 
the mechanisms that make the police more responsive. However, it is responsiveness 
that is prioritised through the Government’s promotion of PCCs and even prior to the 
introduction of PCCs, policing was increasingly being discussed and defined in such 
democratic terms. Responsiveness, representation, participation, involvement and 
transparency are all ideals that have featured prominently in normative discussions 
about policing over the past decade or so. Millen and Stephens (2011) point to the 
difficulties local police authorities had in demonstrating representation of ‘the diverse 
views of those they are serving’ (Millen and Stephens 2011, p.268), a challenge that 
many feel is going to be difficult for PCCs to overcome (Barton and Johns 2014; Lister 
and Rowe 2014; Loader 2014). Millen and Stephens (2012) argue PCCs need to 
acknowledge and address the failings of the preceding tripartite structure of 
accountability, and provide more space for citizen involvement but as Bullock and 
                                                 
3
  It should be noted that Rawls is widely recognised as the most significant contributor to 
liberal moral philosophy in the twentieth century (see Gray 2000; Bridgeman 2004).  
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Leeney (2013) and Brunger (2011) note, this is more difficult to achieve than 
anticipated. Importantly, for the purposes of this paper, these are democratic priorities 
that challenge the erstwhile importance reserved for the liberal ideal of police 
independence.   
PCCs and the reassertion of the police independence ideal 
Whatever the introduction of PCCs means for operational independence in practice, 
there has been an outpouring of support for it as an idea. In this respect at least, there 
has been a reversal in the fortunes of the police independence ideal, which appeared to 
be losing support following Patten (1999).   
The justification for police independence had been articulated most forcefully in 
a well cited and much quoted 1968 legal ruling by Lord Denning4 (see Lustgarten 1986, 
pp.64-65; HAC 2010a, pp.17-18). This common law justification for constabulary 
independence arose in lieu of a statutory definition (HAC 2010a; Brown 1998) and 
suggests that the police are answerable to the law rather than to democratically elected 
representatives. As Loader (1996, p.8) notes, constabulary independence, premised 
upon the constitutional positioning of the office of constable, establishes that a police 
officer of any and all ranks cannot be directed by an ‘external authority’. For Oliver 
(1997, p.20) the acceptance of constabulary independence as a valid doctrine in 
accordance with Lord Denning’s ruling has simply been beyond doubt. Indeed it 
became established as a legal source in support of operational independence despite 
much academic opposition and criticism (Marshall 1978; Lustgarten 1986; Stenning 
2007; Stenning 2011).  
                                                 
4
  R v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118.  
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Lustgarten (1986, p.67), is particularly vocal and candid in criticising Lord 
Denning’s ruling, arguing it is ‘replete with errors of logic and historical analysis, and 
marred by crude value judgements inappropriate to the judicial function’. Patten (1999) 
also viewed operational independence as a flawed concept in his review of policing 
arrangements in Northern Ireland. His preference for the term operational responsibility 
garnered support more widely, for example within the Home Office’s (2004) promotion 
of neighbourhood policing (see Wood & MacAlister 2005).  
However, despite these criticisms and developments, and despite the extent to 
which policing has been subject to more political control and direction in recent years 
(Stenning 2011), the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 strengthens and 
reaffirms the importance of operational independence in policing. This support is 
reiterated and developed within the Policing Protocol Order 2011 to the extent that the 
introduction of PCCs could be seen to have paradoxically increased the autonomy of 
chief officers. At the very least it has established operational independence significantly 
within legislation, albeit without necessarily resolving pre-existing ambiguities (Lister 
2013; Turner 2014).  
The enduring problematic of police independence 
Despite this appearance, operational independence remains a difficult and problematic 
ideal to realise in practice and this is exacerbated as democratic expectations increase 
within England and Wales. Indeed, the Coalition Government’s commitments to the 
operational independence ideal have been accompanied by high profile interventions in 
policing matters, illustrated for example during the 2011 riots in London and other 
English cities. Irrespective of the commitments within the Policing Protocol Order 2011 
towards enhancing the operational independence of the police, the introduction of the 
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PCCs is seen much more as a significant moment in the redefining and narrowing of the 
parameters of police autonomy in practice (Newburn 2012; Orde 2012). 
It is also becoming more apparent that constabulary independence is a peculiarly 
British preoccupation (Stenning 2011). In most parts of the world, including other 
common law jurisdictions, there is much more of an expectation that police will be 
directed routinely by elected officials. Outside of common law jurisdictions police 
operations fall under the direction and control of judicial authorities and as such, 
independence is articulated not in policing, but rather in judicial, terms (Lustgarten 
1986). In many respects, Lord Denning’s articulation of constabulary independence is 
fundamentally a reiteration and bolstering of judicial independence. It roots the idea of 
police independence firmly within the judicial branch of the state, ignoring the 
responsibilities of those within the executive branch of the state to hold the police to 
account politically (Mark 1978). 
Lord Denning’s approach to police independence 
There are two points to emphasise here regarding Lord Denning’s ruling. Firstly, it 
appeals to an idea of police that is rooted in the office of constable, a pre-modern, pre-
democratic institution that is granted a significant degree of discretion and autonomy 
(Brogden and Ellison 2013; Winsor 2012). The office of constable articulates a liberal 
concept of authority and has served the police well in allowing them a significant 
degree of protection from external interference. As Brain (2010, p.423) notes, policy 
makers have been frustrated by ‘having to deal with an office that is somewhere in the 
region of a thousand years old’.  
Of course as Waddington (1999, p.186) reminds us, despite references to the 
‘medieval origins’ of the office of constable, the introduction of the New Police in 1829 
marks a significant break in policing tradition. More importantly, Peel drew upon the 
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historical role of constables primarily to ‘placate political opposition’ to his new body 
of police (Waddington 1999, p.186). 
It is increasingly difficult to see how the office of constable fits within a modern 
democracy, especially given the declining importance of liberal values within 
contemporary society. Indeed, Brogden and Ellison (2013, pp.116-117) argue that the 
high degree of discretion granted to police through the office of constable status is 
paradoxically a contributing factor to what they present as ‘mission creep’ within 
policing. In other words, they see the protection of police independence as a factor in 
undermining the liberal characteristics of police in England and Wales and producing 
something that equates more closely to the features of an illiberal democracy as defined 
by Zakaria (2004). 
The second point to note regarding Lord Denning’s ruling is that it establishes 
police independence through essentially non-democratic means. As Lustgarten (1986, 
p.67) notes, this ruling along with others, establishes ‘the proposition that the judges 
will control the actions of a chief constable in relation to law enforcement’. This is 
something that Sir Robert Mark (1978) found most objectionable.  He raises a concern 
that such judicial directing of the police implies a potential conflict of interest to the 
extent ‘that a court should seek to direct a chief officer to prosecute matters in respect of 
which it might have to sit in judgement’ (Mark 1978, p.137). Likewise, Sklansky (2008, 
p.92) argues that it has long been felt ‘that judicial oversight of policing frustrates 
democracy’.  
At the very least, we might say that if police independence is to be sanctioned 
legitimately, it should be done through a democratic process that involves the masses 
rather than being asserted by an unelected judge, who is free from the immediate 
constraints of democratic pressures. Whilst the support for operational independence 
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articulated in the Policing Protocol Order 2011 goes some way towards providing a 
more democratic justification, it has hardly been the conclusion to an involved or 
significant democratic debate (Lister and Rowe 2014). Rather it merely regurgitates the 
legalistic underpinning of Lord Denning’s ruling and is likely to be interpreted as such, 
for example, as and when legal issues between chief officers and PCCs arise. This is 
illustrated well by Turner (2014), in particular through her reference to Winsor’s (2013) 
interpretation of the Policing Protocol that prioritises a chief officer’s interpretation of 
the law over the political direction of a PCC in a way that takes us back to Lord 
Denning. 
The political understanding of police independence 
As Lustgarten (1986) argues, given the nature of police work it makes little sense to say 
that the police are accountable to the law and nothing else. He provides the example of 
what can happen legitimately and within the law when an officer is called to the scene 
of a fight where common assault has resulted. He identifies different responses that 
police officers routinely carry out under such circumstances, including enforcing the 
law against one or all parties engaged in the fighting, but also interventions that are 
primarily mediatory or conciliatory. The police response can be formal or informal; it 
can involve a caution or an arrest. What happens is determined fundamentally by the 
police officer’s assessment of the situation rather than the law per se. As Lustgarten 
(1986, p.11) explains, the fact that an officer ‘must uphold the law, or is responsible to 
the law, is in practical terms meaningless’. Policing, despite claims to the contrary, is 
unavoidably political (Sklansky 2008; Loader 2014). 
The political nature of policing is reflected in the difficulties and problems 
associated with trying to provide precise legal parameters of operational independence, 
as noted by the Home Affairs Committee (HAC 2010a). But as the Committee also 
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notes, the lack of a precise, legal definition had not unduly hindered the preceding 
tripartite arrangements of police accountability. Indeed, Walker (2000) has argued that a 
degree of vagueness allowed for a necessary level of informality and political 
manoeuvring in the tripartite structures. Walker (2000) and Lustgarten (1986) both 
argue against a black and white approach to the issue of operational independence, 
arguing that political interference in policing matters can be both appropriate and 
inappropriate in different circumstances. Likewise, Stenning (1999; 2007) has argued 
that directing and controlling the police is not the same as holding them to account. The 
police can thus be accountable and independent at the same time (Stenning 1999, 2007). 
More importantly in the context of this paper, the political pressures to interfere in 
policing are driven by democratic values, just as the resistance to such interference is 
motivated by liberal principles.  
Operational independence remained a central component in the tripartite 
structure of police accountability (Marshall 1978; Lustgarten 1986; Reiner 1993; 
Walker 2000; Jones 2008; Rogers 2013), and perhaps more than any other concept it 
has retained a significant degree of support in debates about police accountability. It 
was a recurrent concern expressed within the evidence presented to the Home Affairs 
Committee’s consideration of PCCs (HAC 2010b) and in a subsection on operational 
independence HAC (2010a) reiterates the Government’s (Home Office 2010) stated 
intention to preserve operational independence as a fundamental aspect of British 
policing (see Newburn 2012). For Thorburn (2010), the legitimacy of the police is 
premised upon the disinterested, impartial position of the officer as established within 
the notion of police independence.  
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Police independence in a post liberal world 
The tripartite arrangements and the ideal of a politically independent, disinterested and 
impartial police are informed by the same liberal line of reasoning that leads to the 
separation of powers within liberal democracies. As Zedner (2009) notes, the separation 
of powers is commonly expressed in terms of a triumvirate of authorities in the forms of 
the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, in order to provide checks and balances 
to limit the potential of an overbearing authority being applied indiscriminately. Whilst 
the separation of powers analogy might have its problems when applied to the tripartite 
police accountability mechanisms (Stenning 2011), it usefully draws out the liberal 
underpinnings of the police independence ideal. Indeed, Arblaster (2002) argues that the 
separation of powers became an important constitutional feature within liberal 
democracies because of mistrust in democracy and the fear that an excessively 
democratic society would result in a democratically elected majority imposing its power 
against minorities. It is in this sense that nineteenth century liberals such as John Stuart 
Mill and Alex de Tocqueville stressed the dangers of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ 
(Kennedy 1999, p.107). The separating of powers within liberal democracies acts, 
ideally, as a liberal constraint upon democratically derived authority, and from this 
liberal perspective police independence is intended to act as a constraint and protection 
against the popular, democratic will.  
Declining support for liberalism has seen arguments underpinning independence 
come under fire. MacIntyre (1985) argues that liberals are not ethically neutral but 
rather champions of particular ethical values. Reiner (2010) likewise questions whether 
the police can ever be non-partisan and such reasoning is reflected in Patten’s (1999) 
view that operational independence was inappropriate in the highly partisan context of 
policing in Northern Ireland. Ellison (2007) argues that Patten was determined to ensure 
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policing in Northern Ireland reflected the needs of late modern societies in which many 
of the assumptions about policing in liberal democracies were being called into 
question.  
There is an evident trend towards policing becoming ever more responsive to 
communities, driven by democratic values and enabled by the declining influence of 
liberal principles within contemporary society. Despite repeated commitments to the 
idea of operational independence, it is hard to see how it can be retained in practice 
without serious modification. At the very least, as Newburn (2012, p.42) notes,  
the introduction of PCCs will focus attention once more on what is meant in 
practice by “operational independence” . . . and what forms of political influence 
over policing are appropriate.  
Given the declining influence of liberal ideals and the increasingly uncritical acceptance 
and promotion of democracy, there is a very real danger that operational independence 
could come to be seen, to mimic Oakshott’s (1991) reference to the declining fortunes 
of liberty, as frivolous and disingenuous. 
Concluding remarks 
The view that PCCs are in danger of falling short of the most basic and minimal of 
democratic expectations (Gilmore 2012b; Edwards 2012; Sampson 2012; Millie and 
Bullock 2013; Reiner 2013; Lister and Rowe 2014) is well made and worthy of further 
attention. However, a more pressing concern is the lack of recognition given to the 
liberal characteristics of policing principles, which are becoming increasingly 
vulnerable within advanced democracies. Liberal values remain important constraints 
on democracy to reduce the likelihood of the kind of ‘fig-leaf of populism’ that Reiner 
(2013, p.174) warns against. They are necessary if we are to avoid the kind of illiberal 
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democratic characteristics identified by Zakaria (2004) and the mission creep referred to 
by Brogden and Ellison (2013) developing further within British policing.  
Policing in England and Wales today is arguably more democratic than ever and 
Britain is much more democratic than when the police were introduced in 1829. But 
conversely, policing in England and Wales is becoming increasingly illiberal. The 
powers afforded the police have grown significantly in recent years (Crawford 2008; 
Brogden and Ellison 2013) in spite of apparently liberalising measures such as the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Ewing 2010).  
Therefore, it is not sufficient to point out the importance of constabulary 
independence to liberal democratic ideals of policing. It is also necessary to stress the 
important role that liberal values have played historically in constraining potential 
democratic excesses within liberal democracies. It is not enough to assume liberal 
traditions, such as the office of constable, which by today’s democratic standards seem 
ever more arcane and inappropriate. A case needs to be made today for the professional 
independence of police officers.  
Liberal democratic policing itself needs to be reconstituted. The principles 
associated with Peel5 do not reflect contemporary policing despite claims to the 
contrary. It is beyond the scope of this paper to say what form this reconstitution should 
take but Sherman’s (2011; 2012) arguments about the role the College of Policing can 
play in providing an independent voice as a counter balance to the democratic pressures 
emanating from the PCCs is a useful starting point. The importance of ensuring that the 
College is ‘self-governing’ and ‘independent of government control or funding’ is 
stressed by Sherman (2011) as a necessary means of maximising the positive 
                                                 




contribution police can make within a liberal democracy. Likewise, there is perhaps a 
need to recognise the shift in political theory away from the Rawlsian focus on 
distributive justice towards a growing concern with the primacy of order, as being 
‘arguably more fundamental than the distribution of goods’ (Tralau 2011, p.3).  
The tension between liberalism and democracy comes to the fore as a 
consequence of growing instabilities internationally (Ignatieff 2004; Wilkinson 2006). 
What Lustgarten and Leigh (1994, p.7, fn.15) present as ‘extreme’ and ‘infrequent’ 
examples of chaos and disorder are arguably becoming more common twenty years on. 
As Tralau (2011) has argued, there is a growing interest in the concept of order as a 
primary political concern, reflected in the growing attention paid to Hobbes (1651), and 
more controversially, the German legal scholar Carl Schmitt6. Schmitt’s argument that 
the extension of the electoral franchise leads to a democratic undermining of liberal 
values within a liberal democracy is cited by (Bellamy 2000, p.73): ‘The 
incompatibility of liberalism and democracy went unnoticed so long as the franchise 
was limited’. Increasingly though, as the masses become more engaged in the 
democratic processes, there is a plethora of ‘conflicting interests and passions that 
cannot be reconciled through rational debate’ (Bellamy 2000, p.74). For Schmitt, 
Instead of spreading the liberal virtues of discussion within a heterogeneous 
population, democracy subverts rational debate and replaces it with a putative 
homogeneous popular will.  (cited in Bellamy 2000, p.75). 
However, this is not to say that liberalism and democracy are necessarily incompatible. 
Indeed, there are many reasons why democracy is favoured by liberals. Sen (2009) 
argues that democracy has played a significant role in enhancing the power that reason 
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can have in society. He refers favourably to the deliberative flavour of Mill’s idea ‘of 
democracy as “government by discussion”’ (Sen 2009, p.xiii). Muir and Loader (2011) 
similarly promote a deliberative democratic response to the introduction of PCCs 
suggesting the centre-left embrace the democratising aspects of the initiative and turn it 
to their advantage.  
Democratic pressures upon the police were already significant before PCCs 
were introduced. PCCs are not the cause of police independence becoming more 
problematic, but rather a formalisation of the view that the police should not be above 
the law, and nor should they be beyond politics. Democratic pressures are not 
necessarily problematic in policing, but they need to be balanced by liberal constraints 
in order to preserve the liberal democratic characteristics of policing. More thought 
needs to be given to how this can be achieved in a post liberal society, which is highly 
suspicious of elites and anything that implies a behind-closed-doors way of dealing with 
social problems.  
Nonetheless, we need to recognise the importance of liberal values within 
democratic societies and be more willing to accept that not everything in a democratic 
society should be decided by the popular will of the people. If this recognition is 
unacceptable, then it is hard to see how police independence can be sustained, and 
perhaps more alarmingly, how the spectre of illiberal democratic trends can be avoided 






Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A., 2000. Why did the West Extend the Franchise? 
Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. Vol.115, No.4, pp.1167-1199 
Aitchison, A. and Blaustein, J., 2013. Policing for democracy or democratically 
responsive policing? Examining the limits of externally driven police reform. 
European Journal of Criminology, 10(4) 496–511  
APA, 2010. Response to Policing in the 21st Century: reconnecting police and the 
people. Association of Police Authorities 
Arblaster, A., 2002. Democracy. 3rd Edition. Buckingham: Open University Press 
Baldi, G. and LaFrance, C., 2012. Lessons from the United States Sheriff on the 
Electoral Selection of Police Commissioners in England andWales. Policing: A 
Journal of Policy and Practice. Volume 7, Number 2, pp. 148–157  
Barton, A. and Johns, N., 2014. Engaging the Citizen. In Jennifer Brown (Ed) The 
Future of Policing. London: Routledge, pp. 417-428 
BBC, 2009. Sir Hugh Orde hits out at Tory police plans. BBC News On-line. Accessed 
20/11/09. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8369536.stm  
Bellamy, R., 2000. Rethinking Liberalism. London: Pinter 
Berlin, I., 1958. Two Concepts of Liberty. In Isaiah Berlin, 1990. Four Essays on 
Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp.118-172 
Boyd, R., 2004. Uncivil Society. The Perils of Pluralism and the Making of Modern 
Liberalism. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington 
Brain, T., 2010. A History of Policing in England and Wales from 1974. A Turbulent 
Journey. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Bridgeman, C., 2004. Liberalism and Freedom from the Promise Theory of Contract. 
Modern Law Review, 67 (4): 684-699 
Brogden, M. & Ellison, G., 2013. Policing in an Age of Austerity. A Postcolonial 
Perspective. Abingdon: Routledge 
Brown, A., 1998. Police Governance in England & Wales. London: Cavendish 
Brunger, M., 2011. Governance, accountability and neighbourhood policing in Northern 
Ireland: analysing the role of public meetings. Crime, Law & Social 
Change. Vol. 55, No.2-3, pp. 105-120 
26 
 
Bullock, K. & Leeney, D., 2013. Participation, ‘responsivity’ and accountability in 
neighbourhood policing. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 13(2) 199–214 
Caless, B. & Tong, S., 2013. ‘An appropriate space’: chief officers and police 
accountability. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal. 14:1, 4-
16 
Chakrabarti, S., 2012. Policing, civil liberties and the rule of law. In Raj Jethwa (Ed.) 
Upholding the Queen’s Peace: towards a new consensus on policing. Police 
Federation, pp.20-26 
Collier, D. and Levitsky, S., 1996. Democracy ‘with Adjectives’: Conceptual Innovation 
in Comparative Research. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 
Working Paper # 230 
Cox, G.W. & Ingram III, J.W., 1992. Suffrage Expansion and Legislative Behaviour in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain. Social Science History.Vol.16, No.4, pp.539-560 
Crawford, A., 2008. Refiguring the Community and Professional in Policing and 
Criminal Justice: Some Questions of Legitimace. In J. Shapland J (ed). Justice, 
Community and Civil Society: A Contested Terrain. Cullompton, Devon: Willan 
Dahl, R.A., 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale 
University Press 
Diamond, L., 1997. Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over?  The Helen Kellogg 
Institute for International Studies. Working Paper #236 
Dryzek, J.S. & Dunleavy, P., 2009. Theories of the Democratic State. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
Dworkin, R., 2000. Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press 
Edwards, A., 2012. Editorial. Criminal Law Review, 2012, 11, 821-823  
Ellison, G., 2007. A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere in the World? Police 
Reform, Political Transition and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland. Police 
Quarterly, 10 (3): 243-269 
Emsley, C., 2009. The Great British Bobby. A History of British Policing from 1829 to 
the Present. London: Quercus 
Ewing, K.D., 2010. Bonfire of the Liberties. New Labour, Human Rights, and the Rule 
of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
27 
 
Fukuyama, F., 2011. The Origins of Political Order. From Prehumen Times to the 
French Revolution. London: Profile 
Garland, D., 2001. The Culture of Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Gilling, D., 2014. Reforming police governance in England and Wales: 
managerialisation and the politics of organisational regime change. Policing and 
Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy, Vol. 24, No.1, pp81-
101 
Gilmore, M., 2012a. Electing Police and Crime Commissioners. The Challenges and 
Opportunities of the New Role. The RUSI Journal, 157:5, 6-11 
Gilmore, M., 2012b. Poll Reflects Public Concerns About Police and Crime 
Commissioners. The RUSI Journal, 157:5, 12-15 
Gray, J., 1995. Liberalism. 2nd Edition. Buckingham: Open University Press  
Gray, J., 2000. Two Faces of Liberalism. Cambridge: Polity 
Green, D., 2012. Speech by Damian Green to the Policy Exchange on 23 October. 
Accessed on-line on 09.11.12 from: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-
centre/speeches/damian-green-policy-exchange 
HAC, 2010a. Policing: Police and Crime Commissioners. House of Commons, Home 
Affairs Committee. Second Report of Session 2010–11. HC511. London: TSO 
HAC, 2010b. Policing: Police and Crime Commissioners. House of Commons, Home 
Affairs Committee. Second Report of Session 2010–11. Volume II. Additional 
written evidence. HC511-II. London: TSO 
Held, D., 2006. Models of Democracy. 3rd Edition. Cambridge: Polity 
Hobbes, T., 1651 Leviathan. A.P.Martinich (Ed.), 2002. Peterborough, Ontario: 
Broadview Press 
Hobsbawm, E., 2007. Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism. London: Little, Brown 
Hobson, C., 2008. Revolution, Representation and the Foundations of Modern 
Democracy. European Journal of Political Theory. 7 (4) 449-471 
Home Office, 2004. Building Communities, Beating Crime. A better police service for 
the 21st century. London: Home Office 
Home Office, 2010. Policing in the 21st Century: reconnecting police and the people. 
Cm 7925. London: TSO 




Innes, M., 1999. ‘An Iron Fist in an Iron Glove?’ The Zero Tolerance Policing Debate. 
The Howard Journal, Vol.38, No.4: 397-410 
Jethwa, R., 2012. Upholding the Queen’s Peace: towards a new consensus on policing. 
Police Federation 
Jones, T., 2008. The accountability of policing. In Tim Newburn (Ed.), Handbook of 
Policing. 2nd Edition. Cullompton, Devon: Willan: pp.693-724 
Joyce, P., 2011. Police reform: from police authorities to police and crime 
commissioners. Safer Communities, Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp.5 - 13  
Karl, T., 1986. Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador. 
In Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva (eds). Elections and Democratization in Latin 
America, 1980–1985. San Diego: University of California 
Kennedy, H., 1999. The politics of intolerance. In Susan Mendus (Ed) The Politics of 
Toleration. Tolerance and Intolerance in Modern Life. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, pp.107-118  
Lentz, S. A. and Chaires, R. H., 2007. The Invention of Peel’s Principles. A study of 
policing `textbook' history. Journal of Criminal Justice. 35(1): 69-79. 
Lister, S., 2013. The New Politics of the Police: Police and Crime Commissioners and 
the ‘Operational Independence’ of the Police. Policing: A Journal of Policy and 
Practice. Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 239-247 
Lister, S. and Rowe, M., 2014. Electing police and crime commissioners in England and 
Wales: prospecting for the democratization of policing. Policing and Society: An 
International Journal of Research and Policy, DOI: 
10.1080/10439463.2013.868461  
Lizzeri, A. & Persico, N., 2004. Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy 
and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's ‘Age of 
Reform’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol.119, No.2, pp.705-763 
Loader, I., 1996. Youth, Policing and Democracy. London: Macmillan 
Loader, I., 2014. Why do the police matter? Beyond the myth of crime fighting. In 
Jennifer Brown (Ed) The Future of Policing. London: Routledge, pp. 40-51 
Locke, John, 1690. The Second Treatise of Government. Edited and Introduced by 
Thomas P. Peardon, 1952. New York: The Library of Liberal Arts 
Lustgarten, L., 1986. The Governance of Police. London: Sweet & Maxwell  
29 
 
Lustgarten, L. & Leighton, I., 1994. In From the Cold: National Security and 
Parliamentary Democracy. Oxford: Clarendon 
MacIntyre, A., 1985. After Virtue. 2nd Edition. London: Duckworth  
Manning, P. K., 2010. Democratic Policing in a Changing World. Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers 
Mark, Sir Robert, 1978. In the Office of Constable. London: Collins 
Marshall, G., 1978. Police Accountability Revisited. In D. Butler & A. Halsey (Eds.). 
Policy and Politics. London: Macmillan 
May, T., 2012. A compelling vision for policing. In Raj Jethwa (Ed.) Upholding the 
Queen’s Peace: towards a new consensus on policing. Police Federation, pp.65-
70 
McLaughlin, E., 2005. Forcing the issue: New Labour, New Localism and the 
Democratic Renewal of Police Accountability. The Howard Journal, 44 (5): 
473-489 
Mill, J.S., 1849. On Liberty. In the 1973 edition of The Utilitarians. New York: Anchor 
Press: pp.473-600 
Millen, F. & Stephens, M., 2011. Policing and accountability: the working of police 
authorities. Policing and Society, 21:3, 265-283  
Millen, F. & Stephens, M., 2012. Police Authorities, Accountability, and Citizenship. 
Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice. Volume 6, Number 3, pp. 261–271 
Millie, A. and Bullock, K., 2013. Policing in a time of contraction and constraint: Re-
imagining the role and function of contemporary policing. Criminology & 
Criminal Justice, 13(2) 133–142  
Muir, R. & Loader, I., 2011. Progressive police and crime commissioners: An 
opportunity for the centre-left. IPPR North. Accessed on-line, 13/11/2011 at: 
http://www.ippr.org/articles/56/7957/progressive-police-and-crime-
commissioners-an-opportunity-for-the-centre-left 
Newburn, T., 2012. Police and Crime Commissioners: The Americanization of policing 
or a very British reform? International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 40 
(2012) 31-46  
Newman, J., Barnes, M., Sullivan, H. & Knops, A., 2004. Public Participation and 
Collaborative Governance. Journal of Social Policy, 33 (2): 203-223 
Neyroud, P.W., 2001. Public Participation in Policing. London: IPPR 
30 
 
Oakshott, M., 1991. Rationalism in politics and other essays. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund 
Oliver, I., 1997. Police, Government and Accountability. (2nd ed.) London: Macmillan 
Orde, Sir Hugh, 2012. The policing puzzle. In Raj Jethwa (Ed.) Upholding the Queen’s 
Peace: towards a new consensus on policing. Police Federation, pp.95-101 
Paetzold, H., 2008. Respect and toleration reconsidered. Review Essay. Philosophy & 
Social Criticism. 34 (8): 941-954 
Patten, C., 1999. A New Beginning. Policing in Northern Ireland. The Report of the 
Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (Patten Report). 
London: HMSO 
Phillips, J.A. & Wetherell, C., 1995. The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political 
Modernization of England. The American Historical Review. Vol.100, No.2, 
pp.411-436 
Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Rawls, J., 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press 
Reiner, R., 1993. Police Accountability: Principles, Patterns and Practices. In Robert 
Reiner & Sarah Spencer (Eds.) Accountable Policing: Effectiveness, 
Empowerment and Equity. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, pp.1-23 
Reiner R., 2010. The Politics of the Police. 4th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press  
Reiner, R., 2013. Who governs? Democracy, plutocracy, science and prophecy in 
policing. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 13(2) 161–180   
Reith, C., 1940. Police Principles and the Problem of War . Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Reith, C. 1956. A New Study of Police History. London: Oliver & Boyd 
Rescher, N., 1993. Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press  
Rogers, C., 2013. The Commissioner cometh: The challenge for democratic policing in 
England and Wales. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 41 (2013) 
132-143  
Sabl, A., 2009. The Last Artificial Virtue: Hume on Toleration and Its Lessons. 
Political Theory. 37 (4): 511-538 
31 
 
Sampson, F., 2012. Hail to the Chief? - How far does the Introduction of Elected Police 
Commissioners Herald a US-Style Politicization of Policing in for the UK? 
Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice. Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 4-15 
Scarman, Lord, 1981. The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981. Report of an Inquiry by 
the Rt. Hon. The Lord Scarman, O.B.E. (Cmnd. 8427). London: HMSO 
Schumpeter, J., 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper 
Sen, A., 2009. The Idea of Justice. London: Penguin 
Sherman, L.W., 2011. Professional Policing and Liberal Democracy, The 2011 
Benjamin Franklin Medal Lecture, Royal Society for the Encouragement of 
Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA), London, 1st November 2011. 
Available as a pdf file online from (accessed 29/08/13): 
http://www.thersa.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/563027/Lawrence-Sherman-
Speech-text-01.11.11.pdf 
Sherman, L.W., 2012. A people’s revolution is under way in the fight against crime. 
The Daily Telegraph, 22nd August 2012. Available from (accessed 29/08/13): 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9492386/A-peoples-
revolution-is-under-way-in-the-fight-against-crime.html 
Simmons, A. John, 2001. Justification and Legitimacy. Essays on Rights and 
Obligations. Cambridge University Press  
Sklansky, D. A., 2008. Democracy and the Police. Stanford: Stanford University Press  
Sklansky, D. A., 2014. The Promise and the Perils of Police Professionalism. In Jennifer 
Brown (Ed) The Future of Policing. London: Routledge, pp. 343-354 
Stenning, P.C., 1999. The independence and accountability of the office of Director of 
Public Prosecutions, and the role of public prosecutions service. In The Hon. F. 
Kaufman, Review of the Nova Scotia Public Prosecution Service: Final Report. 
Halifax, Nova Scotia: Nova Scotia Provincial Government. Appendix D 
Stenning, P.C., 2007. The Idea of the Political ‘Independence’ of the Police: 
International Interpretations and Experiences. In M. Beare & T. Murray 
(eds.) Police and Government Relations: Who’s Calling the Shots? 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 183-256 
Stenning, P.C., 2011. Governance of the Police: Independence, Accountability and 
Interference. Ray Whitrod Memorial Lecture. 6th October 2011 at Flinders 





Stenson, K., 1991. Making Sense of Crime Control. In Kevin Stenson and David 
Cowell (eds). The Politics of Crime Control. London: Sage: pp.1-30 
Stenson, K. and Silverstone, D., 2014. Making Police Accountable. Governance and 
Legitimacy. In Jennifer Brown (Ed) The Future of Policing. London: Routledge, 
pp. 429-445 
Tawney, R.H., 1964 [1931]. Equality. London: Unwin  
Thorburn, M., 2010. Reinventing the night-watchman state? University of Toronto Law 
Journal, Volume 60, Number 2, Spring 2010, pp. 425-443 
Tralau, J., 2011. Introduction: Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt, and three conceptions of 
politics. In Johan Tralau (ed). Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. The Politics of 
Order and Myth. Abingdon: Routledge: pp.3-16 
Turner, L., 2014. PCCs, neo-liberal hegemony and democratic policing. Safer 
Communities, Vol. 13 no. 1, pp. 13-21 
Uglow, S., 1988. Policing Liberal Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Waddington, P.A.J., 1999. Policing Citizens. London: UCL Press 
Walker, N., 2000. Policing in a Changing Constitutional Order . London: Sweet & 
Maxwell 
Wilkinson, P., 2006. Terrorism versus Democracy. The Liberal State Response. 2nd 
Edition. London: Routledge 
Winsor, T., 2012. Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and 
Conditions. Final Report, vols. 1 & 2. Cm 8325-II. London: TSO 
Winsor, T., 2013. Operational independence and the new accountability of policing. 
John Harris Memorial Lecture to the Police Foundation, available at: 
http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/hmcic-tom-winsor-john-harris-memorial-
lecture.pdf (accessed 20 March 2014) 
Wood, D.A. & MacAlister, D., 2005. Accountable, independent and responsive: the 
need for balance in police governance. International Journal of Police Science 
and Management. Vol.7, No.3: 197-207 
Zakaria, F., 2004. The Future of Freedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.  
London: W.W.Norton & Company 
Zedner, L., 2009. Security. Abingdon: Routledge 
